container audit
GTM-WXBWGWR
4 tags, 2 custom scripts, 2 third-party hosts — an ordinary container, near the middle of what we measure (median: 39 tags, 4 custom scripts).
- 2 custom HTML tags carrying 4 KB of JavaScript. This runs on every page the container loads on.
- 2 third-party hosts reachable from its tags.
- Measurement runs through a server container on its own domain — the mark of a mature setup, and rarer than the tooling vendors imply.
Tags4
Custom scripts2
Third parties2
Delivered487 KB
Versions18
What we observed
A real browser loaded wingsforlifeworldrun.com a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.
Container loaded from
qm.wingsforlifeworldrun.com — the site's own host, and googletagmanager.comMeasurement sent to
qm.wingsforlifeworldrun.com — not GoogleMeasurement runs through the site's own infrastructure. Part of the tag library still comes from Google, which is normal — the two are loaded separately.
Forwarded to
GA4 ×3 — read from the measurement id, not the hostname
Consent
OneTrust answered its own API. Nothing measured until it was granted — no analytics or advertising hit left the page beforehand, and 3 fired afterwards. That is the outcome consent is meant to produce. 4 hosts appeared only after consent was granted. Google recorded
gcs=G100 (all denied).Third parties contacted
13 hosts — cdn.segment.com, o4506947488317440.ingest.us.sentry.io, www.googletagmanager.com, cdn.cookielaw.org, geolocation.onetrust.com, api.storyblok.com, events.eu1.segmentapis.com, assets.redbullshop.com, and 5 more
dataLayer events seen
init-meta, gtm.js, gtm.dom, OneTrustLoaded, OptanonLoaded, OptanonUpdate, virtPath, gtm.load
Where the data goes
Confirmed — a browser watched this site send measurement data to qm.wingsforlifeworldrun.com, not to Google. observed on wingsforlifeworldrun.com More info »
Findings
Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.
reviewdocument.write (1)
1 piece of custom code call document.write.
Whydocument.write blocks the HTML parser while it runs, and browsers ignore it entirely once the page has finished parsing — so an async-loaded tag using it can silently do nothing.
CheckIf these tags fire on page load they are costing render time; if they fire later they may not be working at all. Worth confirming the tag still does what it was added to do.
Seenseen in 18.4% of 46,522 containers measured
reviewWrites cookies directly (1)
1 piece of custom code set cookies in code.
WhyCookies set this way bypass GTM's consent settings, because the consent checks live in the tag templates rather than in raw JavaScript.
CheckIf any of these cookies are used for analytics or advertising, confirm they are still gated on a consent decision.
Seenseen in 21.2% of 46,522 containers measured
reviewNo consent signal in the container (1)
Nothing in this container sets, reads, or gates on a consent state.
WhyThe container itself neither sets a Consent Mode default, holds any tag back for consent, nor references a known consent platform. Either enforcement lives entirely outside GTM — where it cannot be audited from here — or tags fire regardless of what a visitor chose.
CheckIf a consent platform blocks scripts before GTM loads, this is fine — confirm that is actually the case. If not, tags are firing on a choice nobody recorded.
Seenseen in 52.1% of 46,522 containers measured
infoUses browser storage (2)
2 pieces of custom code read or write localStorage or sessionStorage.
WhyBrowser storage persists across visits and is not covered by cookie consent tooling, so it is easy to overlook when auditing what you keep on a visitor's device.
CheckConfirm nothing personal is being kept there, and that it is covered by your privacy notice.
Seenseen in 23.3% of 46,522 containers measured
Third parties it can reach
Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »
Detected on
Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.
What this audit describes
Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.
| Container | GTM-WXBWGWR |
|---|---|
| Published version | 18 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes. |
| Read at | 2026-08-23 18:22:43 UTC (a month ago) |
| Source | https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-WXBWGWR |
| Body checksum | cd3f3f4506604e979b107d9f5dc23497b89c4f9685d36b089219ea042259b5acEvidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead. |
Re-audit
This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.
Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »