tagora
container audit

GTM-WQC2SJ

56 tags, 32 custom scripts, 8 third-party hosts — an ordinary container, near the middle of what we measure (median: 39 tags, 4 custom scripts).

Tags56
Custom scripts32
Third parties8
Delivered504 KB
Versions66

What we observed

A real browser loaded beachboardwalk.com a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.

Container loaded from not observed loading
Measurement sent to google-analytics.com — Google
Third parties contacted 16 hosts — cdn-ilemogd.nitrocdn.com, cdnjs.cloudflare.com, scbb-scbbcalifornia.secure-cdn.na.accessoticketing.com, chat.satis.fi, customer-api.open-meteo.com, acsbapp.com, cdn.acsbapp.com, player.vimeo.com, and 8 more

Where the data goes

Nothing fired — we loaded the page and no tag library or measurement request ran, which usually means a consent banner held everything back. The container below still describes what would run once it does. observed on beachboardwalk.com More info »

Findings

Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.

reviewNo consent signal in the container (1)
Nothing in this container sets, reads, or gates on a consent state.

WhyThe container itself neither sets a Consent Mode default, holds any tag back for consent, nor references a known consent platform. Either enforcement lives entirely outside GTM — where it cannot be audited from here — or tags fire regardless of what a visitor chose.

CheckIf a consent platform blocks scripts before GTM loads, this is fine — confirm that is actually the case. If not, tags are firing on a choice nobody recorded.

Seenseen in 52.1% of 46,522 containers measured

infoLoads JavaScript from another host (26)
26 pieces of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.

WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.

CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.

Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured

infoUses browser storage (2)
2 pieces of custom code read or write localStorage or sessionStorage.

WhyBrowser storage persists across visits and is not covered by cookie consent tooling, so it is easy to overlook when auditing what you keep on a visitor's device.

CheckConfirm nothing personal is being kept there, and that it is covered by your privacy notice.

Seenseen in 23.3% of 46,522 containers measured

infoVendor IDs written into custom code (1)
1 vendor ID is pasted directly into custom HTML rather than held in a variable or template.

WhyChanging a property, pixel or account then means editing every tag that mentions it, and any one that gets missed keeps sending to the old destination indefinitely.

CheckFine if the ID never changes. If you have ever migrated a property, check that none of these still point at the old one.

Seenseen in 31.4% of 46,522 containers measured

Third parties it can reach

Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »

www.google-analytics.com ×18c.amazon-adsystem.com ×14insight.adsrvr.org ×11www.googleadservices.com ×3connect.facebook.net ×1js.adsrvr.org ×1static.hotjar.com ×1www.facebook.com ×1

What the custom templates can do

Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.

__cvt_KT4F4 gallery injects code from c.amazon-adsystem.com · runs page-level globals

Detected on

Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.

beachboardwalk.com

What this audit describes

Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.

ContainerGTM-WQC2SJ
Published version66 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes.
Read at2026-08-23 18:21:02 UTC (a month ago)
Sourcehttps://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-WQC2SJ
Body checksumaefe39372d65882545a8735c1673726742549fa2bb6e3b21337ca8adbf2accfb
Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead.

Re-audit

This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.

Re-audit GTM-WQC2SJ

Check another container

Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »