container audit
GTM-WKRWCWD
31 tags, 12 custom scripts, 4 third-party hosts — an ordinary container, near the middle of what we measure (median: 39 tags, 4 custom scripts).
- 12 custom HTML tags carrying 6 KB of JavaScript. This runs on every page the container loads on.
- 4 third-party hosts reachable from its tags.
- Measurement runs through a server container on its own domain — the mark of a mature setup, and rarer than the tooling vendors imply.
Tags31
Custom scripts12
Third parties4
Delivered505 KB
Versions296
What we observed
A real browser loaded blinto.se a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.
Container loaded from
bridge.blinto.se — the site's own host, and googletagmanager.comMeasurement sent to
ubvijlrp.eus.stape.net — not GoogleMeasurement runs through the site's own infrastructure. Part of the tag library still comes from Google, which is normal — the two are loaded separately.
Forwarded to
GA4 ×2 — read from the measurement id, not the hostname
Consent
a consent banner was present and we accepted it. Nothing measured until it was granted — no analytics or advertising hit left the page beforehand, and 1 fired afterwards. That is the outcome consent is meant to produce. 4 hosts appeared only after consent was granted. Google recorded
gcs=G111 (all granted).Third parties contacted
25 hosts — pro.fontawesome.com, kit.fontawesome.com, cdnjs.cloudflare.com, code.jquery.com, ajax.googleapis.com, fonts.googleapis.com, translate.google.com, ka-p.fontawesome.com, and 17 more
dataLayer events seen
gtm.js, gtm.dom, gtm.load, gtm.historyChange-v2, cookie_cat_necessary, cookie_cat_functional, cookie_cat_statistic, cookie_cat_marketing, cookie_cat_unclassified
Where the data goes
Confirmed — a browser watched this site send measurement data to ubvijlrp.eus.stape.net, not to Google. observed on blinto.se More info »
Findings
Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.
reviewWrites cookies directly (1)
1 piece of custom code set cookies in code.
WhyCookies set this way bypass GTM's consent settings, because the consent checks live in the tag templates rather than in raw JavaScript.
CheckIf any of these cookies are used for analytics or advertising, confirm they are still gated on a consent decision.
Seenseen in 21.2% of 46,522 containers measured
infoLoads JavaScript from another host (3)
3 pieces of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.
WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.
CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.
Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured
infoConsent configuration detected (2)
The container declares one or more consent signals.
WhyConsent handling is present in the container. This describes what the artifact declares; what actually happened on the page is measured separately, above.
CheckConfirm these settings match the consent policy you intend to enforce, and compare them with the before-and-after observation.
Seenseen in 44.6% of 46,522 containers measured
Third parties it can reach
Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »
What the custom templates can do
Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.
__cvt_10656960_180 private injects code from x.cookieinformation.com · runs page-level globals__cvt_5RM3Q gallery injects code from connect.facebook.net, capi-automation.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com · runs page-level globals__cvt_KT9RV gallery injects code from dynamic.criteo.com__cvt_NGKXT gallery injects code from cdn.leadinfo.net · runs page-level globalsDetected on
Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.
What this audit describes
Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.
| Container | GTM-WKRWCWD |
|---|---|
| Published version | 296 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes. |
| Read at | 2026-08-23 18:19:31 UTC (a month ago) |
| Source | https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-WKRWCWD |
| Body checksum | d08e7ff08d899edbeb7467a3d8d4655f0fbd4db80449b15532b3f3627ca65c33Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead. |
Re-audit
This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.
Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »