container audit
GTM-W22QHZ9
42 tags, 14 custom scripts, 7 third-party hosts — an ordinary container, near the middle of what we measure (median: 39 tags, 4 custom scripts).
- 14 custom HTML tags carrying 10 KB of JavaScript. This runs on every page the container loads on.
- 7 third-party hosts reachable from its tags — more than 70% of the 46,522 containers we have measured.
- Measurement runs through a server container on its own domain — the mark of a mature setup, and rarer than the tooling vendors imply.
- 393 published versions — each one live for every visitor the moment it was published.
Tags42
Custom scripts14
Third parties7
Delivered531 KB
Versions393
What we observed
A real browser loaded straitstimes.com a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.
Container loaded from
googletagmanager.com — GoogleMeasurement sent to
tagweb.straitstimes.com — not GoogleMeasurement is first-party; the container still loads from Google. These are separate decisions, and this is the more common of the two.
Forwarded to
GA4 ×4 — read from the measurement id, not the hostname
Consent
Quantcast answered its own API. 4 measurement hits left the page before it was granted, carrying a client id (whether that is permitted depends on jurisdiction, and this was not a European visit). 10 hosts appeared only after consent was granted. Google recorded
gcs=G1 (no consent signal). 10 advertising hosts were contacted before anything was granted.Third parties contacted
25 hosts — cassette.sphdigital.com.sg, cdn.sphlabs.com, securepubads.g.doubleclick.net, dev.visualwebsiteoptimizer.com, adtag.sphdigital.com, cdp.sph.com.sg, static1.straitstimes.com.sg, static.chartbeat.com, and 17 more
dataLayer events seen
gtm.js, gtm.dom, gtm.load
Where the data goes
Confirmed — a browser watched this site send measurement data to tagweb.straitstimes.com, not to Google. observed on straitstimes.com More info »
Findings
Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.
infoLoads JavaScript from another host (5)
5 pieces of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.
WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.
CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.
Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured
infoUses browser storage (2)
2 pieces of custom code read or write localStorage or sessionStorage.
WhyBrowser storage persists across visits and is not covered by cookie consent tooling, so it is easy to overlook when auditing what you keep on a visitor's device.
CheckConfirm nothing personal is being kept there, and that it is covered by your privacy notice.
Seenseen in 23.3% of 46,522 containers measured
infoConsent configuration detected (1)
The container declares one or more consent signals.
WhyConsent handling is present in the container. This describes what the artifact declares; what actually happened on the page is measured separately, above.
CheckConfirm these settings match the consent policy you intend to enforce, and compare them with the before-and-after observation.
Seenseen in 44.6% of 46,522 containers measured
Third parties it can reach
Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »
sb.scorecardresearch.com ×2buy.geni.us ×1embed.dugout.com ×1s.skimresources.com ×1trc.taboola.com ×1widgets.outbrain.com ×1www.youtube.com ×1
What the custom templates can do
Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.
__cvt_5RM3Q gallery injects code from connect.facebook.net, capi-automation.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com · runs page-level globals__cvt_8946930_615 private injects code from snap.licdn.com__cvt_8946930_714 private injects code from cdn.taboola.com__cvt_8946930_878 private runs page-level globals__cvt_8946930_886 private injects code from cdn.moengage.com · runs page-level globalsDetected on
Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.
What this audit describes
Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.
| Container | GTM-W22QHZ9 |
|---|---|
| Published version | 393 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes. |
| Read at | 2026-08-22 10:47:04 UTC (a month ago) |
| Source | https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-W22QHZ9 |
| Body checksum | 529cf0436067a9fed7f7b3cbd774642f400ddbc53fdea69c952b733bea0073b4Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead. |
Re-audit
This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.
Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »