container audit
GTM-TTTKV5B
This container ships 53 hand-written scripts (38 KB of JavaScript) to every visitor — more than 90% of the 46,522 containers we have measured. That is an application's worth of code, delivered as tag configuration.
- 9 third-party hosts reachable from its tags — more than 80% of the 46,522 containers we have measured.
- Measurement runs through a server container on its own domain — the mark of a mature setup, and rarer than the tooling vendors imply.
- 908 published versions — each one live for every visitor the moment it was published.
Tags275
Custom scripts53
Third parties9
Delivered831 KB
Versions908
What we observed
A real browser loaded deltazakelijk.nl a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.
Container loaded from
googletagmanager.com — GoogleMeasurement sent to
sgtm.delta.nl — not GoogleMeasurement is first-party; the container still loads from Google. These are separate decisions, and this is the more common of the two.
Forwarded to
GA4 ×10 — read from the measurement id, not the hostname
Consent
Cookiebot answered its own API. Measurement fired beforehand but carried no identifier —
analytics_storage was denied, which is Consent Mode working as designed rather than a gap. 10 hosts appeared only after consent was granted. Google recorded gcs=G100 (all denied).Third parties contacted
25 hosts — cdn.jsdelivr.net, www.googletagmanager.com, www.delta.nl, media.umbraco.io, dev.visualwebsiteoptimizer.com, s3.delta.nl, ingest.promptwatch.com, pingvp.com, and 17 more
dataLayer events seen
td.init, VWO, gtm.js, gtm.dom, gtm.load, gtm.elementVisibility, after_load, gtm.click, cookie_consent_preferences, cookie_consent_statistics, cookie_consent_marketing, sqzl_PersonalizationView, +1 more
Where the data goes
Confirmed — a browser watched this site send measurement data to sgtm.delta.nl, not to Google. observed on deltazakelijk.nl More info »
Findings
Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.
reviewdocument.write (4)
4 pieces of custom code call document.write.
Whydocument.write blocks the HTML parser while it runs, and browsers ignore it entirely once the page has finished parsing — so an async-loaded tag using it can silently do nothing.
CheckIf these tags fire on page load they are costing render time; if they fire later they may not be working at all. Worth confirming the tag still does what it was added to do.
Seenseen in 18.4% of 46,522 containers measured
reviewWrites cookies directly (4)
4 pieces of custom code set cookies in code.
WhyCookies set this way bypass GTM's consent settings, because the consent checks live in the tag templates rather than in raw JavaScript.
CheckIf any of these cookies are used for analytics or advertising, confirm they are still gated on a consent decision.
Seenseen in 21.2% of 46,522 containers measured
infoOne variable that a great deal depends on (71)
"gtm.triggers" is read by 71 tags and triggers — more than anything else in this container.
WhyGTM shows you where a variable is defined, never how much depends on it. Editing this one touches a large share of the container at once, and whatever breaks will surface somewhere that looks unrelated to the change.
CheckBefore changing it, check what reads it. If it feeds both measurement and consent or routing logic, split those uses apart first.
Seenseen in 10.1% of 46,522 containers measured
infoUses browser storage (38)
38 pieces of custom code read or write localStorage or sessionStorage.
WhyBrowser storage persists across visits and is not covered by cookie consent tooling, so it is easy to overlook when auditing what you keep on a visitor's device.
CheckConfirm nothing personal is being kept there, and that it is covered by your privacy notice.
Seenseen in 23.3% of 46,522 containers measured
infoLoads JavaScript from another host (9)
9 pieces of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.
WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.
CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.
Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured
infoConsent configuration detected (4)
The container declares one or more consent signals.
WhyConsent handling is present in the container. This describes what the artifact declares; what actually happened on the page is measured separately, above.
CheckConfirm these settings match the consent policy you intend to enforce, and compare them with the before-and-after observation.
Seenseen in 44.6% of 46,522 containers measured
Third parties it can reach
Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »
target.digitalaudience.io ×4assets.exatom.io ×3sqzly.delta.nl ×3tdstatics.delta.nl ×3squeezely.tech ×2a.imgstatics.com ×1cdn.leadinfo.net ×1ib.adnxs.com ×1s2.adform.net ×1
What the custom templates can do
Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.
__cvt_MBTSV gallery injects code from stapecdn.com · runs page-level globals__cvt_57SF4 gallery injects code from x.cookiebot.com, x.cookiebot.eu__cvt_11982939_494 private injects code from x.adform.net · runs page-level globals__cvt_K8GSG gallery runs page-level globals__cvt_NC6HJ gallery injects code from x.dwin1.com · runs page-level globals__cvt_11982939_1213 private injects code from deploy.mopinion.com · runs page-level globals__cvt_11982939_1619 private runs page-level globals__cvt_5TP9K gallery injects code from x.dwin1.com__cvt_MQDKZ gallery injects code from www.clarity.ms · runs page-level globals__cvt_T9BKT gallery injects code from staging.bgmin.cdn.billygrace.com, bgmin.cdn.billygrace.com · runs page-level globals__cvt_TB7ZX gallery injects code from snap.licdn.com__cvt_WP4JF gallery injects code from staging.bgmin.cdn.billygrace.com, bgmin.cdn.billygrace.com · runs page-level globalsDetected on
Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.
What this audit describes
Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.
| Container | GTM-TTTKV5B |
|---|---|
| Published version | 908 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes. |
| Read at | 2026-08-22 14:09:51 UTC (a month ago) |
| Source | https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-TTTKV5B |
| Body checksum | 5e470813e19d9eb121617fcfc5bdfcada4266dcb601752ce6b8bf58f1413dc68Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead. |
Re-audit
This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.
Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »