tagora
container audit

GTM-TRMG3ZWM

This container ships 36 hand-written scripts (13 KB of JavaScript) to every visitor — more than 90% of the 46,522 containers we have measured. That is an application's worth of code, delivered as tag configuration.

Tags48
Custom scripts36
Third parties11
Delivered520 KB
Versions18

What we observed

A real browser loaded knightfrank.co.uk a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.

Container loaded from googletagmanager.com — Google
Measurement sent to sst.knightfrank.co.uk — not Google

Measurement is first-party; the container still loads from Google. These are separate decisions, and this is the more common of the two.

Forwarded to GA4 ×4 — read from the measurement id, not the hostname
Consent a consent banner was present and we accepted it. Measurement fired beforehand but carried no identifier — analytics_storage was denied, which is Consent Mode working as designed rather than a gap. 4 hosts appeared only after consent was granted. Google recorded gcs=G100 (all denied).
Third parties contacted 21 hosts — cdn.tagcommander.com, widget.trustpilot.com, www.googletagmanager.com, js.monitor.azure.com, www.google.com, rum-static.pingdom.net, www.gstatic.com, cdn.trustcommander.net, and 13 more
dataLayer events seen gtm.js, tc_consent_ready, tc_marketing_off, tc_analytics_off, epiforms_listener_init, epiforms_listener_bound, gtm.dom, gtm.load, gtm.scrollDepth, gtm.click, tc_marketing_on, tc_analytics_on

Where the data goes

Confirmed — a browser watched this site send measurement data to sst.knightfrank.co.uk, not to Google. observed on knightfrank.co.uk More info »

Findings

Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.

infoLoads JavaScript from another host (3)
3 pieces of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.

WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.

CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.

Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured

infoUses browser storage (3)
3 pieces of custom code read or write localStorage or sessionStorage.

WhyBrowser storage persists across visits and is not covered by cookie consent tooling, so it is easy to overlook when auditing what you keep on a visitor's device.

CheckConfirm nothing personal is being kept there, and that it is covered by your privacy notice.

Seenseen in 23.3% of 46,522 containers measured

infoConsent configuration detected (1)
The container declares one or more consent signals.

WhyConsent handling is present in the container. This describes what the artifact declares; what actually happened on the page is measured separately, above.

CheckConfirm these settings match the consent policy you intend to enforce, and compare them with the before-and-after observation.

Seenseen in 44.6% of 46,522 containers measured

infoVendor IDs written into custom code (1)
1 vendor ID is pasted directly into custom HTML rather than held in a variable or template.

WhyChanging a property, pixel or account then means editing every tag that mentions it, and any one that gets missed keeps sending to the old destination indefinitely.

CheckFine if the ID never changes. If you have ever migrated a property, check that none of these still point at the old one.

Seenseen in 31.4% of 46,522 containers measured

Third parties it can reach

Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »

www.googleadservices.com ×7www.google-analytics.com ×2bat.bing.net ×1bzrcdn.openai.com ×1connect.facebook.net ×1px.ads.linkedin.com ×1service.giosg.com ×1snap.licdn.com ×1tags.srv.stackadapt.com ×1www.facebook.com ×1www.redditstatic.com ×1

What the custom templates can do

Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.

__cvt_M6QD2 gallery injects code from siteimproveanalytics.com
__cvt_PBGZL gallery injects code from www.redditstatic.com · runs page-level globals

Detected on

Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.

knightfrank.co.uk

What this audit describes

Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.

ContainerGTM-TRMG3ZWM
Published version18 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes.
Read at2026-08-23 18:12:45 UTC (a month ago)
Sourcehttps://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-TRMG3ZWM
Body checksum1b81203fc00a9e3119d9d4e0558d1a6aa591a3d7be9445dc3b1dbdc0986cb86c
Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead.

Re-audit

This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.

Re-audit GTM-TRMG3ZWM

Check another container

Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »