container audit
GTM-TQ4SXSK
64 tags, 33 custom scripts, 7 third-party hosts — an ordinary container, near the middle of what we measure (median: 39 tags, 4 custom scripts).
- 33 custom HTML tags carrying 16 KB of JavaScript — more than 80% of the 46,522 containers we have measured. This runs on every page the container loads on.
- 7 third-party hosts reachable from its tags — more than 70% of the 46,522 containers we have measured.
duplicate-ga4-configis uncommon — under 5% of the containers we have measured have it. That is context rather than a verdict: a server container is rarer still and is a sign of a mature setup. What it means is in the finding itself.
Tags64
Custom scripts33
Third parties7
Delivered508 KB
Versions71
What we observed
A real browser loaded keyuca.com a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.
Container loaded from
googletagmanager.com — GoogleMeasurement sent to
google-analytics.com — GoogleConsent
no consent gate responded on this page, so there was nothing to hold measurement back (banners are often shown only to visitors in certain regions, and this was not a European visit). 4 hosts appeared only after consent was granted.
Third parties contacted
25 hosts — typesquare.com, use.typekit.net, cdn.jsdelivr.net, statics.a8.net, bbc.bibian.co.jp, www.visumo.jp, www.googletagmanager.com, s.yimg.jp, and 17 more
dataLayer events seen
gtm.js, gtm.dom, gtm.historyChange-v2, gtm.load
Where the data goes
Not observed — on the page we loaded, measurement went to Google and nowhere else. observed on keyuca.com More info »
Findings
Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.
reviewdocument.write (16)
16 pieces of custom code call document.write.
Whydocument.write blocks the HTML parser while it runs, and browsers ignore it entirely once the page has finished parsing — so an async-loaded tag using it can silently do nothing.
CheckIf these tags fire on page load they are costing render time; if they fire later they may not be working at all. Worth confirming the tag still does what it was added to do.
Seenseen in 18.4% of 46,522 containers measured
reviewWrites cookies directly (2)
2 pieces of custom code set cookies in code.
WhyCookies set this way bypass GTM's consent settings, because the consent checks live in the tag templates rather than in raw JavaScript.
CheckIf any of these cookies are used for analytics or advertising, confirm they are still gated on a consent decision.
Seenseen in 21.2% of 46,522 containers measured
reviewSame GA4 property configured more than once (1)
G-TCN6PHRH3Y is configured by 2 separate tags.
WhyEach config tag initialises the property independently, so a single page view can be counted once per tag. Sessions, users and conversion rates all inherit the error.
CheckIf more than one of these fires on the same page you are double-counting. Compare against a known-good day, or check for a step change in traffic when the second tag was added.
Seenseen in 4.8% of 46,522 containers measured
reviewNo consent signal in the container (1)
Nothing in this container sets, reads, or gates on a consent state.
WhyThe container itself neither sets a Consent Mode default, holds any tag back for consent, nor references a known consent platform. Either enforcement lives entirely outside GTM — where it cannot be audited from here — or tags fire regardless of what a visitor chose.
CheckIf a consent platform blocks scripts before GTM loads, this is fine — confirm that is actually the case. If not, tags are firing on a choice nobody recorded.
Seenseen in 52.1% of 46,522 containers measured
infoLoads JavaScript from another host (2)
2 pieces of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.
WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.
CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.
Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured
Third parties it can reach
Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »
www.google-analytics.com ×5www.googleadservices.com ×2checkout-api.worldshopping.jp ×1dmp.im-apps.net ×1s.yimg.jp ×1static.criteo.net ×1www.clarity.ms ×1
What the custom templates can do
Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.
__cvt_9597612_121 private injects code from s.yimg.jp · runs page-level globals__cvt_9597612_123 private injects code from s.yimg.jp · runs page-level globals__cvt_9597612_50 private injects code from s.yimg.jp · runs page-level globalsDetected on
Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.
What this audit describes
Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.
| Container | GTM-TQ4SXSK |
|---|---|
| Published version | 71 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes. |
| Read at | 2026-08-13 16:09:23 UTC (a month ago) |
| Source | https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-TQ4SXSK |
| Body checksum | 492f73c2e5eedd85d073c558d7dec99b3c2cab3546ff85ec0945e57c4caff936Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead. |
Re-audit
This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.
Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »