tagora
container audit

GTM-TC4NPQD

This container ships 38 hand-written scripts (31 KB of JavaScript) to every visitor — more than 90% of the 46,522 containers we have measured. That is an application's worth of code, delivered as tag configuration.

Tags139
Custom scripts38
Third parties7
Delivered638 KB
Versions102

What we observed

A real browser loaded alpari.com a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.

Container loaded from data.alpari.com — the site's own host, and googletagmanager.com
Measurement sent to data.alpari.com — not Google

Measurement runs through the site's own infrastructure. Part of the tag library still comes from Google, which is normal — the two are loaded separately.

Forwarded to GA4 ×2 — read from the measurement id, not the hostname
Consent a consent banner was present and we accepted it. 2 measurement hits left the page before it was granted, carrying a client id (whether that is permitted depends on jurisdiction, and this was not a European visit). 1 host appeared only after consent was granted. Google recorded gcs=G111 (all granted). 5 advertising hosts were contacted before anything was granted.
Third parties contacted 25 hosts — cdn.builder.io, onelinksmartscript.appsflyer.com, get.geojs.io, zn6qufsds3crdoutf-exinity.siteintercept.qualtrics.com, widget.beesender.com, siteintercept.qualtrics.com, api.rudderstack.com, fonts.googleapis.com, and 17 more
dataLayer events seen gtm.js, is_rabbit, page_lang, page_view, gtm.dom, gtm.load, nextroll-ready, nextroll-consent, gtm.linkClick, gtm.historyChange, gtm.historyChange-v2

Where the data goes

Confirmed — a browser watched this site send measurement data to data.alpari.com, not to Google. observed on alpari.com More info »

Findings

Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.

reviewWrites cookies directly (2)
2 pieces of custom code set cookies in code.

WhyCookies set this way bypass GTM's consent settings, because the consent checks live in the tag templates rather than in raw JavaScript.

CheckIf any of these cookies are used for analytics or advertising, confirm they are still gated on a consent decision.

Seenseen in 21.2% of 46,522 containers measured

reviewdocument.write (1)
1 piece of custom code call document.write.

Whydocument.write blocks the HTML parser while it runs, and browsers ignore it entirely once the page has finished parsing — so an async-loaded tag using it can silently do nothing.

CheckIf these tags fire on page load they are costing render time; if they fire later they may not be working at all. Worth confirming the tag still does what it was added to do.

Seenseen in 18.4% of 46,522 containers measured

reviewWrites innerHTML (1)
1 piece of custom code assign to innerHTML.

WhyAssigning innerHTML parses the string as HTML. If any of it comes from the URL, the page or a cookie, that is a script-injection route into your own site.

CheckCheck whether the assigned value is a fixed template or built from something a visitor can influence.

Seenseen in 5.7% of 46,522 containers measured

reviewSame GA4 property configured more than once (1)
G-4L3682YDB4 is configured by 2 separate tags.

WhyEach config tag initialises the property independently, so a single page view can be counted once per tag. Sessions, users and conversion rates all inherit the error.

CheckIf more than one of these fires on the same page you are double-counting. Compare against a known-good day, or check for a step change in traffic when the second tag was added.

Seenseen in 4.8% of 46,522 containers measured

infoConsent configuration detected (3)
The container declares one or more consent signals.

WhyConsent handling is present in the container. This describes what the artifact declares; what actually happened on the page is measured separately, above.

CheckConfirm these settings match the consent policy you intend to enforce, and compare them with the before-and-after observation.

Seenseen in 44.6% of 46,522 containers measured

infoLoads JavaScript from another host (2)
2 pieces of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.

WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.

CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.

Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured

infoUses browser storage (2)
2 pieces of custom code read or write localStorage or sessionStorage.

WhyBrowser storage persists across visits and is not covered by cookie consent tooling, so it is easy to overlook when auditing what you keep on a visitor's device.

CheckConfirm nothing personal is being kept there, and that it is covered by your privacy notice.

Seenseen in 23.3% of 46,522 containers measured

Third parties it can reach

Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »

telegram.org ×2alparieoatyfgo.dataplane.rudderstack.com ×1api.analytics.otclick.ru ×1cdn.rudderlabs.com ×1cdn.targetads.io ×1polyfill-fastly.io ×1qntm.it.com ×1

What the custom templates can do

Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.

__cvt_130694742_21 private injects code from mc.yandex.ru, cdn.jsdelivr.net · runs page-level globals
__cvt_K8GSG gallery runs page-level globals
__cvt_130694742_117 private injects code from connect.facebook.net · runs page-level globals
__cvt_PLW64 gallery injects code from cdn.taboola.com
__cvt_WF3R3 gallery injects code from cdn.amplitude.com

Detected on

Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.

alpari.com

What this audit describes

Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.

ContainerGTM-TC4NPQD
Published version102 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes.
Read at2026-08-12 22:49:42 UTC (a month ago)
Sourcehttps://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-TC4NPQD
Body checksumb9eab0afad5b51f3060d58f93eaa15b84c8f96c0118e8c93dfe852436e8b041b
Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead.

Re-audit

This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.

Re-audit GTM-TC4NPQD

Check another container

Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »