container audit

GTM-T8HG9X4

This container ships 43 hand-written scripts (43 KB of JavaScript) to every visitor — more than 90% of the 46,522 containers we have measured. That is an application's worth of code, delivered as tag configuration.

Tags99

Custom scripts43

Third parties21

Delivered610 KB

Versions245

What we observed

A real browser loaded transunion.com a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.

Container loaded from googletagmanager.com — Google

Measurement sent to google-analytics.com — Google

Consent OneTrust answered its own API. 2 measurement hits left the page before it was granted, carrying a client id (whether that is permitted depends on jurisdiction, and this was not a European visit). 1 host appeared only after consent was granted. 6 advertising hosts were contacted before anything was granted.

Third parties contacted 25 hosts — assets.adobedtm.com, cdn-ukwest.onetrust.com, fonts.googleapis.com, dpm.demdex.net, api.company-target.com, www.googletagmanager.com, lptag.liveperson.net, static.hotjar.com, and 17 more

dataLayer events seen gtm.js, OneTrustLoaded, OptanonLoaded, CTA Updates Ready, Glimpse Loaded, Send Monitoring, Attribution Done, Attribution Added, gtm.dom, gtm.load, gtm.click

Where the data goes

Not observed — on the page we loaded, measurement went to Google and nowhere else. observed on transunion.com More info »

Findings

Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.

reviewWrites cookies directly (3)

3 pieces of custom code set cookies in code.

WhyCookies set this way bypass GTM's consent settings, because the consent checks live in the tag templates rather than in raw JavaScript.

CheckIf any of these cookies are used for analytics or advertising, confirm they are still gated on a consent decision.

Seenseen in 21.2% of 46,522 containers measured

infoLoads JavaScript from another host (6)

6 pieces of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.

WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.

CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.

Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured

infoVendor IDs written into custom code (4)

4 vendor IDs are pasted directly into custom HTML rather than held in a variable or template.

WhyChanging a property, pixel or account then means editing every tag that mentions it, and any one that gets missed keeps sending to the old destination indefinitely.

CheckFine if the ID never changes. If you have ever migrated a property, check that none of these still point at the old one.

Seenseen in 31.4% of 46,522 containers measured

infoConsent configuration detected (2)

The container declares one or more consent signals.

WhyConsent handling is present in the container. This describes what the artifact declares; what actually happened on the page is measured separately, above.

CheckConfirm these settings match the consent policy you intend to enforce, and compare them with the before-and-after observation.

Seenseen in 44.6% of 46,522 containers measured

Third parties it can reach

Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »

What the custom templates can do

Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.

__cvt_13298379_334 private injects code from cdn.taboola.com

__cvt_13298379_468 private runs page-level globals

__cvt_5D477 gallery injects code from p.teads.tv · runs page-level globals

__cvt_5RM3Q gallery injects code from connect.facebook.net, capi-automation.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com · runs page-level globals

__cvt_TB7ZX gallery injects code from snap.licdn.com

Detected on

Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.

transunion.com

What this audit describes

Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.

Container	`GTM-T8HG9X4`
Published version	`245` — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes.
Read at	2026-08-22 10:41:08 UTC (a month ago)
Source	`https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-T8HG9X4`
Body checksum	`6664908c409afe36ce6078333ae4a62f3e321ba1d475d7502210a4832d50d52e` Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead.

Re-audit

This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.

Re-audit GTM-T8HG9X4

Check another container

Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »