container audit
GTM-PRHWJLJ
1 tags, 1 custom scripts, 1 third-party host — an ordinary container, near the middle of what we measure (median: 39 tags, 4 custom scripts).
- 1 custom HTML tag carrying 0 KB of JavaScript. This runs on every page the container loads on.
- 1 third-party host reachable from its tags.
Tags1
Custom scripts1
Third parties1
Delivered319 KB
Versions3
What we observed
A real browser loaded cineserie.com a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.
Container loaded from
not observed loading
Measurement sent to
google-analytics.com — GoogleConsent
Quantcast answered its own API. 10 hosts appeared only after consent was granted.
Third parties contacted
25 hosts — pagead2.googlesyndication.com, tags.refinery89.com, static.cloudflareinsights.com, googleads.g.doubleclick.net, fundingchoicesmessages.google.com, contextual.refinery89.com, t.seedtag.com, cdn.consentmanager.net, and 17 more
dataLayer events seen
cmpEvent, cmpEventLoadedLayerNotOpen, cmpEventLoadFinished
Where the data goes
Nothing fired — we loaded the page and no tag library or measurement request ran, which usually means a consent banner held everything back. The container below still describes what would run once it does. observed on cineserie.com More info »
Findings
Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.
reviewNo consent signal in the container (1)
Nothing in this container sets, reads, or gates on a consent state.
WhyThe container itself neither sets a Consent Mode default, holds any tag back for consent, nor references a known consent platform. Either enforcement lives entirely outside GTM — where it cannot be audited from here — or tags fire regardless of what a visitor chose.
CheckIf a consent platform blocks scripts before GTM loads, this is fine — confirm that is actually the case. If not, tags are firing on a choice nobody recorded.
Seenseen in 52.1% of 46,522 containers measured
Third parties it can reach
Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »
Detected on
Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.
What this audit describes
Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.
| Container | GTM-PRHWJLJ |
|---|---|
| Published version | 3 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes. |
| Read at | 2026-08-13 14:58:36 UTC (a month ago) |
| Source | https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-PRHWJLJ |
| Body checksum | ab9464db438438dec5bba4c7958540c61b4f2c21dfb3a96d8bce47a84d95f90dEvidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead. |
Re-audit
This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.
Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »