tagora
container audit

GTM-PNWPLZDF

66 tags, 19 custom scripts, 4 third-party hosts — an ordinary container, near the middle of what we measure (median: 39 tags, 4 custom scripts).

Tags66
Custom scripts19
Third parties4
Delivered556 KB
Versions287

What we observed

A real browser loaded fressnapf.de a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.

Container loaded from googletagmanager.com — Google
Measurement sent to google-analytics.com — Google
Consent Usercentrics answered its own API. 10 hosts appeared only after consent was granted. Google recorded gcs=G111 (all granted).
Third parties contacted 25 hosts — media.os.fressnapf.com, www.googletagmanager.com, web.cmp.usercentrics.eu, v1.api.service.cmp.usercentrics.eu, app.usercentrics.eu, uct.service.usercentrics.eu, consent-api.service.consent.usercentrics.eu, www.clarity.ms, and 17 more
dataLayer events seen gtm.dom, gtm.load

Where the data goes

Not observed — on the page we loaded, measurement went to Google and nowhere else. observed on fressnapf.de More info »

Findings

Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.

reviewWrites innerHTML (2)
2 pieces of custom code assign to innerHTML.

WhyAssigning innerHTML parses the string as HTML. If any of it comes from the URL, the page or a cookie, that is a script-injection route into your own site.

CheckCheck whether the assigned value is a fixed template or built from something a visitor can influence.

Seenseen in 5.7% of 46,522 containers measured

reviewWrites cookies directly (1)
1 piece of custom code set cookies in code.

WhyCookies set this way bypass GTM's consent settings, because the consent checks live in the tag templates rather than in raw JavaScript.

CheckIf any of these cookies are used for analytics or advertising, confirm they are still gated on a consent decision.

Seenseen in 21.2% of 46,522 containers measured

infoLoads JavaScript from another host (7)
7 pieces of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.

WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.

CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.

Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured

infoUses browser storage (3)
3 pieces of custom code read or write localStorage or sessionStorage.

WhyBrowser storage persists across visits and is not covered by cookie consent tooling, so it is easy to overlook when auditing what you keep on a visitor's device.

CheckConfirm nothing personal is being kept there, and that it is covered by your privacy notice.

Seenseen in 23.3% of 46,522 containers measured

infoConsent configuration detected (3)
The container declares one or more consent signals.

WhyConsent handling is present in the container. This describes what the artifact declares; what actually happened on the page is measured separately, above.

CheckConfirm these settings match the consent policy you intend to enforce, and compare them with the before-and-after observation.

Seenseen in 44.6% of 46,522 containers measured

Third parties it can reach

Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »

no.ref ×3maps.google.com ×1thelab-apiserver-dev.concentrix.de ×1www. ×1

What the custom templates can do

Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.

__cvt_201307741_259 private runs page-level globals
__cvt_201307741_214 private injects code from cdn.scarabresearch.com · runs page-level globals
__cvt_201307741_224 private runs page-level globals
__cvt_201307741_228 private injects code from www.dwin1.com, www.awin1.com · runs page-level globals
__cvt_201307741_394 private injects code from app.usercentrics.eu, web.cmp.usercentrics.eu · runs page-level globals
__cvt_201307741_222 private runs page-level globals
__cvt_201307741_226 private runs page-level globals
__cvt_201307741_230 private injects code from www.googletagmanager.com, googleads.g.doubleclick.net · runs page-level globals
__cvt_201307741_233 private runs page-level globals
__cvt_201307741_238 private runs page-level globals
__cvt_201307741_240 private injects code from bat.bing.com, x.fressnapf.com, x.fressnapf.de, x.fressnapf.at, x.fressnapf.ch, x.fressnapf.lu · runs page-level globals
__cvt_201307741_249 private injects code from tags.creativecdn.com, ams.creativecdn.com · runs page-level globals
__cvt_201307741_252 private injects code from www.clarity.ms · runs page-level globals
__cvt_201307741_266 private injects code from p.teads.tv, x.fressnapf.com, x.fressnapf.de, x.fressnapf.at, x.fressnapf.ch, x.fressnapf.lu · runs page-level globals
__cvt_201307741_288 private runs page-level globals
__cvt_201307741_372 private runs page-level globals
__cvt_201307741_45 private injects code from cdn.jsdelivr.net · runs page-level globals
__cvt_T5P92 gallery injects code from js.adsrvr.org

Detected on

Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.

fressnapf.de

What this audit describes

Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.

ContainerGTM-PNWPLZDF
Published version287 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes.
Read at2026-08-22 13:30:02 UTC (a month ago)
Sourcehttps://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-PNWPLZDF
Body checksum59c80a6895f0a36069ae80408311be1d594bb3da84963989e77c87612f290985
Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead.

Re-audit

This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.

Re-audit GTM-PNWPLZDF

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