container audit

GTM-PKFTZMK

This container ships 73 hand-written scripts (58 KB of JavaScript) to every visitor — more than 96% of the 46,522 containers we have measured. That is an application's worth of code, delivered as tag configuration.

1,003 published versions — each one live for every visitor the moment it was published.

Tags126

Custom scripts73

Third parties32

Delivered665 KB

Versions1003

What we observed

A real browser loaded sofitel.com a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.

Container loaded from googletagmanager.com — Google

Measurement sent to dsv.accor.com — not Google

Measurement is first-party; the container still loads from Google. These are separate decisions, and this is the more common of the two.

Forwarded to GA4 ×6 — read from the measurement id, not the hostname

Consent OneTrust answered its own API. Nothing measured until it was granted — no analytics or advertising hit left the page beforehand, and 1 fired afterwards. That is the outcome consent is meant to produce. 10 hosts appeared only after consent was granted. Google recorded gcs=G100 (all denied).

Third parties contacted 25 hosts — cdn.signalfx.com, static-p46175-e229011.adobeaemcloud.com, rum.hlx.page, sofitel.accor.com, qchmhd61sj.kameleoon.eu, cdn.cookielaw.org, dsv.accor.com, w.usabilla.com, and 17 more

dataLayer events seen gtm.js, gtm.dom, OneTrustLoaded, OptanonLoaded, push_dynamic_datas, seenaptic, pageViewFired, experience_impression, gtm.load

Where the data goes

Confirmed — a browser watched this site send measurement data to dsv.accor.com, not to Google. observed on sofitel.com More info »

Findings

Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.

reviewdocument.write (10)

10 pieces of custom code call document.write.

Whydocument.write blocks the HTML parser while it runs, and browsers ignore it entirely once the page has finished parsing — so an async-loaded tag using it can silently do nothing.

CheckIf these tags fire on page load they are costing render time; if they fire later they may not be working at all. Worth confirming the tag still does what it was added to do.

Seenseen in 18.4% of 46,522 containers measured

reviewWrites cookies directly (5)

5 pieces of custom code set cookies in code.

WhyCookies set this way bypass GTM's consent settings, because the consent checks live in the tag templates rather than in raw JavaScript.

CheckIf any of these cookies are used for analytics or advertising, confirm they are still gated on a consent decision.

Seenseen in 21.2% of 46,522 containers measured

reviewHardcoded http:// URL (3)

3 pieces of custom code reference a plain http:// address.

WhyOn an https:// page the browser blocks or upgrades these. Blocked means the tag quietly stops working; upgraded only works if that host also serves https.

CheckCheck whether the hosts below still respond over https, and update the URLs.

Seenseen in 12.8% of 46,522 containers measured

infoOne variable that a great deal depends on (43)

"page_data.pagename" is read by 43 tags and triggers — more than anything else in this container.

WhyGTM shows you where a variable is defined, never how much depends on it. Editing this one touches a large share of the container at once, and whatever breaks will surface somewhere that looks unrelated to the change.

CheckBefore changing it, check what reads it. If it feeds both measurement and consent or routing logic, split those uses apart first.

Seenseen in 10.1% of 46,522 containers measured

infoLoads JavaScript from another host (11)

11 pieces of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.

WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.

CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.

Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured

infoConsent configuration detected (2)

The container declares one or more consent signals.

WhyConsent handling is present in the container. This describes what the artifact declares; what actually happened on the page is measured separately, above.

CheckConfirm these settings match the consent policy you intend to enforce, and compare them with the before-and-after observation.

Seenseen in 44.6% of 46,522 containers measured

infoUses browser storage (1)

1 piece of custom code read or write localStorage or sessionStorage.

WhyBrowser storage persists across visits and is not covered by cookie consent tooling, so it is easy to overlook when auditing what you keep on a visitor's device.

CheckConfirm nothing personal is being kept there, and that it is covered by your privacy notice.

Seenseen in 23.3% of 46,522 containers measured

Third parties it can reach

Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »

What the custom templates can do

Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.

__cvt_KF8K9 gallery injects code from analytics.tiktok.com · runs page-level globals

__cvt_5D477 gallery injects code from p.teads.tv · runs page-level globals

__cvt_5RM3Q gallery injects code from connect.facebook.net, capi-automation.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com · runs page-level globals

__cvt_K4VXG gallery injects code from sc-static.net, tr.snapchat.com · runs page-level globals

__cvt_PLW64 gallery injects code from cdn.taboola.com

Detected on

Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.

movenpick.com sofitel.com mercure.com novotel.com ibis.com accorhotels.com

What this audit describes

Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.

Container	`GTM-PKFTZMK`
Published version	`1003` — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes.
Read at	2026-08-22 14:06:54 UTC (a month ago)
Source	`https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-PKFTZMK`
Body checksum	`a5d150ecb1ab5e0c9c8d6b8a04da6cef212239dbb11bf786a541f0c3a367c81a` Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead.

Re-audit

This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.

Re-audit GTM-PKFTZMK

Check another container

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