tagora
container audit

GTM-P43LJK9

3 tags, 2 custom scripts, 3 third-party hosts — an ordinary container, near the middle of what we measure (median: 39 tags, 4 custom scripts).

Tags3
Custom scripts2
Third parties3
Delivered341 KB
Versions69

What we observed

A real browser loaded h1g.jp a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.

Container loaded from not observed loading
Measurement sent to google-analytics.com — Google
Third parties contacted 25 hosts — da9v1g7imu10q.cloudfront.net, static.cloudflareinsights.com, js.ssp.bance.jp, l.logly.co.jp, api.php, dmp.im-apps.net, audiencedata.im-apps.net, bid.ssp.bance.jp, and 17 more

Where the data goes

Nothing fired — we loaded the page and no tag library or measurement request ran, which usually means a consent banner held everything back. The container below still describes what would run once it does. observed on h1g.jp More info »

Findings

Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.

revieweval() (1)
1 piece of custom code call eval().

Whyeval turns a string into executing code. If any part of that string comes from the page, the URL or a cookie, whoever controls that input controls the code.

CheckTrace where the evaluated string comes from. A fixed literal is harmless; anything derived from user-controllable input is not.

Seenseen in 0.5% of 46,522 containers measured

reviewNo consent signal in the container (1)
Nothing in this container sets, reads, or gates on a consent state.

WhyThe container itself neither sets a Consent Mode default, holds any tag back for consent, nor references a known consent platform. Either enforcement lives entirely outside GTM — where it cannot be audited from here — or tags fire regardless of what a visitor chose.

CheckIf a consent platform blocks scripts before GTM loads, this is fine — confirm that is actually the case. If not, tags are firing on a choice nobody recorded.

Seenseen in 52.1% of 46,522 containers measured

Third parties it can reach

Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »

automate-frontend.linksynergy.com ×1automate.linksynergy.com ×1www.google-analytics.com ×1

Detected on

Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.

h1g.jp

What this audit describes

Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.

ContainerGTM-P43LJK9
Published version69 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes.
Read at2026-08-23 17:59:21 UTC (a month ago)
Sourcehttps://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-P43LJK9
Body checksumd46f1b4bd3fb781599e8cfc36b24d3ee959a113aa2aa49f34bb146e141cc177f
Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead.

Re-audit

This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.

Re-audit GTM-P43LJK9

Check another container

Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »