container audit

GTM-NXRV5HTG

This container ships 38 hand-written scripts (48 KB of JavaScript) to every visitor — more than 90% of the 46,522 containers we have measured. That is an application's worth of code, delivered as tag configuration.

Tags84

Custom scripts38

Third parties26

Delivered549 KB

Versions26

What we observed

A real browser loaded philips.nl a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.

Container loaded from googletagmanager.com — Google

Measurement sent to www.philips.nl — not Google

Measurement is first-party; the container still loads from Google. These are separate decisions, and this is the more common of the two.

Forwarded to GA4 ×2 — read from the measurement id, not the hostname

Consent a consent banner was present and we accepted it. Nothing measured until it was granted — no analytics or advertising hit left the page beforehand, and 2 fired afterwards. That is the outcome consent is meant to produce. 10 hosts appeared only after consent was granted. Google recorded gcs=G111 (all granted).

Third parties contacted 25 hosts — static.cloudflareinsights.com, eu-images.contentstack.com, cdn-scripts.signifyd.com, consent.trustarc.com, imgs.signifyd.com, dp.signifyd.com, h.online-metrix.net, h64.online-metrix.net, and 17 more

Where the data goes

Confirmed — a browser watched this site send measurement data to www.philips.nl, not to Google. observed on philips.nl More info »

Findings

Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.

reviewWrites cookies directly (1)

1 piece of custom code set cookies in code.

WhyCookies set this way bypass GTM's consent settings, because the consent checks live in the tag templates rather than in raw JavaScript.

CheckIf any of these cookies are used for analytics or advertising, confirm they are still gated on a consent decision.

Seenseen in 21.2% of 46,522 containers measured

reviewNo consent signal in the container (1)

Nothing in this container sets, reads, or gates on a consent state.

WhyThe container itself neither sets a Consent Mode default, holds any tag back for consent, nor references a known consent platform. Either enforcement lives entirely outside GTM — where it cannot be audited from here — or tags fire regardless of what a visitor chose.

CheckIf a consent platform blocks scripts before GTM loads, this is fine — confirm that is actually the case. If not, tags are firing on a choice nobody recorded.

Seenseen in 52.1% of 46,522 containers measured

infoOne variable that a great deal depends on (95)

"pageProps.locale_country" is read by 95 tags and triggers — more than anything else in this container.

WhyGTM shows you where a variable is defined, never how much depends on it. Editing this one touches a large share of the container at once, and whatever breaks will surface somewhere that looks unrelated to the change.

CheckBefore changing it, check what reads it. If it feeds both measurement and consent or routing logic, split those uses apart first.

Seenseen in 10.1% of 46,522 containers measured

infoLoads JavaScript from another host (18)

18 pieces of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.

WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.

CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.

Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured

infoUses browser storage (1)

1 piece of custom code read or write localStorage or sessionStorage.

WhyBrowser storage persists across visits and is not covered by cookie consent tooling, so it is easy to overlook when auditing what you keep on a visitor's device.

CheckConfirm nothing personal is being kept there, and that it is covered by your privacy notice.

Seenseen in 23.3% of 46,522 containers measured

infoVendor IDs written into custom code (1)

1 vendor ID is pasted directly into custom HTML rather than held in a variable or template.

WhyChanging a property, pixel or account then means editing every tag that mentions it, and any one that gets missed keeps sending to the old destination indefinitely.

CheckFine if the ID never changes. If you have ever migrated a property, check that none of these still point at the old one.

Seenseen in 31.4% of 46,522 containers measured

Third parties it can reach

Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »

What the custom templates can do

Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.

__cvt_221361806_40 private injects code from gum.criteo.com, dynamic.criteo.com · runs page-level globals

__cvt_221361806_32 private injects code from x.collect.igodigital.com · runs page-level globals

__cvt_221361806_11 private injects code from x.licdn.com

__cvt_221361806_14 private injects code from c.seznam.cz · runs page-level globals

__cvt_221361806_15 private injects code from c.seznam.cz · runs page-level globals

__cvt_221361806_17 private injects code from x.terracycle.com

__cvt_221361806_18 private injects code from acsbapp.com · runs page-level globals

__cvt_221361806_22 private runs page-level globals

__cvt_221361806_26 private injects code from www.refer.philips.ro, www.refer.philips.com.br, www.refer.usa.philips.com, www.refer.philips.nl, www.refer.philips.cz, www.refer.philips.es · runs page-level globals

__cvt_221361806_28 private injects code from connect.facebook.net · runs page-level globals

__cvt_221361806_33 private injects code from x.iadvize.com · runs page-level globals

__cvt_221361806_34 private runs page-level globals

__cvt_221361806_5 private injects code from api.soreto.com

__cvt_221361806_7 private injects code from x.yieldify.com, x.useinsider.com, x.collect.igodigital.com, x.tradedoubler.com, x.refer.usa.philips.com, rewriteapi.bluerank.pl

__cvt_221361806_8 private injects code from x.attn.tv · runs page-level globals

__cvt_221361806_9 private runs page-level globals

__cvt_K4VXG gallery injects code from sc-static.net, tr.snapchat.com · runs page-level globals

Detected on

Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.

philips.fr philips.nl philips.co.uk philips.de

What this audit describes

Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.

Container	`GTM-NXRV5HTG`
Published version	`26` — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes.
Read at	2026-08-22 10:31:51 UTC (a month ago)
Source	`https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-NXRV5HTG`
Body checksum	`ddb410672bee3bb3f4688a7a03793463eba699d6fe645ad2cad124f5197c7899` Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead.

Re-audit

This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.

Re-audit GTM-NXRV5HTG

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