container audit
GTM-NV6J4QW
229 tags, 700 KB delivered to every visitor — more than 90% of the 46,522 containers we have measured. Size is a description here, not a fault.
- 18 custom HTML tags carrying 11 KB of JavaScript — more than 70% of the 46,522 containers we have measured. This runs on every page the container loads on.
- 4 third-party hosts reachable from its tags.
- Measurement runs through a server container on its own domain — the mark of a mature setup, and rarer than the tooling vendors imply.
- 477 published versions — each one live for every visitor the moment it was published.
duplicate-ads-conversionis uncommon — under 4% of the containers we have measured have it. That is context rather than a verdict: a server container is rarer still and is a sign of a mature setup. What it means is in the finding itself.
Tags229
Custom scripts18
Third parties4
Delivered700 KB
Versions477
What we observed
A real browser loaded adaptavist.com a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.
Container loaded from
googletagmanager.com — GoogleMeasurement sent to
google-analytics.com — GoogleConsent
a consent banner was present and we accepted it. 3 measurement hits left the page before it was granted, carrying a client id (whether that is permitted depends on jurisdiction, and this was not a European visit). 5 hosts appeared only after consent was granted. Google recorded
gcs=G111 (all granted). 6 advertising hosts were contacted before anything was granted.Third parties contacted
25 hosts — cdn.sanity.io, js.adaptavistassets.com, consent.truste.com, consent.trustarc.com, cdn.segment.com, script.crazyegg.com, api.segment.io, static.hotjar.com, and 17 more
dataLayer events seen
gtm.js, Loaded a Page, gtm.dom, gtm.load, ConsentChanged
Where the data goes
Not observed — on the page we loaded, measurement went to Google and nowhere else. observed on adaptavist.com More info »
Findings
Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.
reviewWrites cookies directly (3)
3 pieces of custom code set cookies in code.
WhyCookies set this way bypass GTM's consent settings, because the consent checks live in the tag templates rather than in raw JavaScript.
CheckIf any of these cookies are used for analytics or advertising, confirm they are still gated on a consent decision.
Seenseen in 21.2% of 46,522 containers measured
reviewSame Google Ads conversion defined more than once (1)
1 conversion action is defined by more than one tag.
WhyA conversion ID plus label identifies one action. Two tags carrying the same pair can report the same conversion twice, inflating conversion counts and the ROAS that bidding runs on.
CheckCheck whether both tags can fire on the same page. If they can, your Ads reporting is overstating this action and automated bidding is optimising against it.
Seenseen in 3.8% of 46,522 containers measured
infoOne variable that a great deal depends on (59)
"userId" is read by 59 tags and triggers — more than anything else in this container.
WhyGTM shows you where a variable is defined, never how much depends on it. Editing this one touches a large share of the container at once, and whatever breaks will surface somewhere that looks unrelated to the change.
CheckBefore changing it, check what reads it. If it feeds both measurement and consent or routing logic, split those uses apart first.
Seenseen in 10.1% of 46,522 containers measured
infoLoads JavaScript from another host (4)
4 pieces of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.
WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.
CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.
Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured
infoConsent configuration detected (4)
The container declares one or more consent signals.
WhyConsent handling is present in the container. This describes what the artifact declares; what actually happened on the page is measured separately, above.
CheckConfirm these settings match the consent policy you intend to enforce, and compare them with the before-and-after observation.
Seenseen in 44.6% of 46,522 containers measured
infoUses browser storage (1)
1 piece of custom code read or write localStorage or sessionStorage.
WhyBrowser storage persists across visits and is not covered by cookie consent tooling, so it is easy to overlook when auditing what you keep on a visitor's device.
CheckConfirm nothing personal is being kept there, and that it is covered by your privacy notice.
Seenseen in 23.3% of 46,522 containers measured
Third parties it can reach
Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »
What the custom templates can do
Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.
__cvt_5RFHV gallery injects code from consent.trustarc.com · runs page-level globals__cvt_12984245_366 private injects code from snap.licdn.com__cvt_5RM3Q gallery injects code from connect.facebook.net, capi-automation.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com · runs page-level globals__cvt_NF7PV gallery injects code from unpkg.com__cvt_PBGZL gallery injects code from www.redditstatic.com · runs page-level globalsDetected on
Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.
What this audit describes
Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.
| Container | GTM-NV6J4QW |
|---|---|
| Published version | 477 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes. |
| Read at | 2026-08-23 17:57:44 UTC (a month ago) |
| Source | https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-NV6J4QW |
| Body checksum | 7328b97eaba02e17e42a351835e2fe3d989c8974c85911fff9cc55302b2549c3Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead. |
Re-audit
This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.
Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »