container audit
GTM-NDGZ7TR
This container can hand execution to 16 third parties — more than 95% of the 46,522 containers we have measured. Each serves code it controls, which can change at any time.
- 25 custom HTML tags carrying 40 KB of JavaScript — more than 80% of the 46,522 containers we have measured. This runs on every page the container loads on.
Tags86
Custom scripts25
Third parties16
Delivered583 KB
Versions176
Where the data goes
Not checked — this audit ran against a container ID, so no page was read. More info »
Findings
Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.
reviewdocument.write (19)
19 pieces of custom code call document.write.
Whydocument.write blocks the HTML parser while it runs, and browsers ignore it entirely once the page has finished parsing — so an async-loaded tag using it can silently do nothing.
CheckIf these tags fire on page load they are costing render time; if they fire later they may not be working at all. Worth confirming the tag still does what it was added to do.
Seenseen in 18.4% of 46,522 containers measured
reviewWrites cookies directly (1)
1 piece of custom code set cookies in code.
WhyCookies set this way bypass GTM's consent settings, because the consent checks live in the tag templates rather than in raw JavaScript.
CheckIf any of these cookies are used for analytics or advertising, confirm they are still gated on a consent decision.
Seenseen in 21.2% of 46,522 containers measured
infoConsent configuration detected (4)
The container declares one or more consent signals.
WhyConsent handling is present in the container. This describes what the artifact declares; what actually happened on the page is measured separately, above.
CheckConfirm these settings match the consent policy you intend to enforce, and compare them with the before-and-after observation.
Seenseen in 44.6% of 46,522 containers measured
infoUses browser storage (2)
2 pieces of custom code read or write localStorage or sessionStorage.
WhyBrowser storage persists across visits and is not covered by cookie consent tooling, so it is easy to overlook when auditing what you keep on a visitor's device.
CheckConfirm nothing personal is being kept there, and that it is covered by your privacy notice.
Seenseen in 23.3% of 46,522 containers measured
infoVendor IDs written into custom code (1)
1 vendor ID is pasted directly into custom HTML rather than held in a variable or template.
WhyChanging a property, pixel or account then means editing every tag that mentions it, and any one that gets missed keeps sending to the old destination indefinitely.
CheckFine if the ID never changes. If you have ever migrated a property, check that none of these still point at the old one.
Seenseen in 31.4% of 46,522 containers measured
Third parties it can reach
Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »
www.rbcroyalbank.com ×84www.rbcbank.com ×30www.googleadservices.com ×13www.rbcbanqueroyale.com ×12cdn.cookielaw.org ×11www.google-analytics.com ×3apply.rbcbank.com ×1connect.facebook.net ×1js-cdn.dynatrace.com ×1rbcbank.mortgagewebcenter.com ×1rbcbank.test.mortgagewebcenter.com ×1rbcbankusaredemption.com ×1rbcweb.uat.kobie.com ×1www.cnb.com ×1www.facebook.com ×1www2.rbcbank.com ×1
What the custom templates can do
Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.
__cvt_6985182_1584 private injects code from www.xg4ken.com · runs page-level globalsDetected on
Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.
What this audit describes
Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.
| Container | GTM-NDGZ7TR |
|---|---|
| Published version | 176 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes. |
| Read at | 2026-08-13 13:49:27 UTC (a month ago) |
| Source | https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-NDGZ7TR |
| Body checksum | fd02d03122d4b90c8aa5529945a47f1e676cf742f4ef1eb0c1a17c7afba7bc85Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead. |
Re-audit
This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.
Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »