container audit
GTM-NC6X444
200 tags, 11 custom scripts, 3 third-party hosts — an ordinary container, near the middle of what we measure (median: 39 tags, 4 custom scripts).
- 11 custom HTML tags carrying 4 KB of JavaScript. This runs on every page the container loads on.
- 3 third-party hosts reachable from its tags.
- Measurement runs through a server container on its own domain — the mark of a mature setup, and rarer than the tooling vendors imply.
Tags200
Custom scripts11
Third parties3
Delivered547 KB
Versions109
What we observed
A real browser loaded biltorvet.dk a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.
Container loaded from
ss.biltorvet.dk — the site's own hostMeasurement sent to
ss.biltorvet.dk — not GoogleBoth wires run through infrastructure the site controls.
Forwarded to
GA4 ×4 — read from the measurement id, not the hostname
Consent
a consent banner was present and we accepted it. Measurement fired beforehand but carried no identifier —
analytics_storage was denied, which is Consent Mode working as designed rather than a gap. 4 hosts appeared only after consent was granted. Google recorded gcs=G100 (all denied).Third parties contacted
23 hosts — policy.app.cookieinformation.com, services.autoit.dk, challenges.cloudflare.com, www.youtube-nocookie.com, picture.biltorvetcdn.net, fonts.gstatic.com, rr2---sn-nhpax-ua8r.googlevideo.com, www.gstatic.com, and 15 more
dataLayer events seen
gtm.js, gtm.dom, gtm.scrollDepth, gtm.load, gtm.click, cookie_cat_necessary, cookie_cat_functional, cookie_cat_statistic, cookie_cat_marketing, cookie_cat_unclassified
Where the data goes
Confirmed — a browser watched this site send measurement data to ss.biltorvet.dk, not to Google. observed on biltorvet.dk More info »
Findings
Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.
infoLoads JavaScript from another host (1)
1 piece of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.
WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.
CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.
Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured
infoConsent configuration detected (1)
The container declares one or more consent signals.
WhyConsent handling is present in the container. This describes what the artifact declares; what actually happened on the page is measured separately, above.
CheckConfirm these settings match the consent policy you intend to enforce, and compare them with the before-and-after observation.
Seenseen in 44.6% of 46,522 containers measured
infoVendor IDs written into custom code (1)
1 vendor ID is pasted directly into custom HTML rather than held in a variable or template.
WhyChanging a property, pixel or account then means editing every tag that mentions it, and any one that gets missed keeps sending to the old destination indefinitely.
CheckFine if the ID never changes. If you have ever migrated a property, check that none of these still point at the old one.
Seenseen in 31.4% of 46,522 containers measured
Third parties it can reach
Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »
What the custom templates can do
Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.
__cvt_MBTSV gallery injects code from stapecdn.com · runs page-level globalsDetected on
Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.
What this audit describes
Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.
| Container | GTM-NC6X444 |
|---|---|
| Published version | 109 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes. |
| Read at | 2026-08-23 17:53:20 UTC (a month ago) |
| Source | https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-NC6X444 |
| Body checksum | 1508aa8894bd405e38d5303778284e2d755308f414d1d6bca718dd6ca896796cEvidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead. |
Re-audit
This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.
Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »