tagora
container audit

GTM-N6526PC

40 tags, 10 custom scripts, 3 third-party hosts — an ordinary container, near the middle of what we measure (median: 39 tags, 4 custom scripts).

Tags40
Custom scripts10
Third parties3
Delivered437 KB
Versions352

What we observed

A real browser loaded wallex.ir a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.

Container loaded from not observed loading
Measurement sent to google-analytics.com — Google
Third parties contacted 9 hosts — widget.arcaptcha.net, cdn.yektanet.com, s1.mediaad.org, www.gstatic.com, audience.yektanet.com, ua.yektanet.com, event.yektanet.com, mediacdn.mediaad.org, and 1 more
dataLayer events seen view-screen

Where the data goes

Nothing fired — we loaded the page and no tag library or measurement request ran, which usually means a consent banner held everything back. The container below still describes what would run once it does. observed on wallex.ir More info »

Findings

Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.

reviewWrites cookies directly (3)
3 pieces of custom code set cookies in code.

WhyCookies set this way bypass GTM's consent settings, because the consent checks live in the tag templates rather than in raw JavaScript.

CheckIf any of these cookies are used for analytics or advertising, confirm they are still gated on a consent decision.

Seenseen in 21.2% of 46,522 containers measured

reviewNo consent signal in the container (1)
Nothing in this container sets, reads, or gates on a consent state.

WhyThe container itself neither sets a Consent Mode default, holds any tag back for consent, nor references a known consent platform. Either enforcement lives entirely outside GTM — where it cannot be audited from here — or tags fire regardless of what a visitor chose.

CheckIf a consent platform blocks scripts before GTM loads, this is fine — confirm that is actually the case. If not, tags are firing on a choice nobody recorded.

Seenseen in 52.1% of 46,522 containers measured

infoLoads JavaScript from another host (1)
1 piece of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.

WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.

CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.

Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured

infoUses browser storage (1)
1 piece of custom code read or write localStorage or sessionStorage.

WhyBrowser storage persists across visits and is not covered by cookie consent tooling, so it is easy to overlook when auditing what you keep on a visitor's device.

CheckConfirm nothing personal is being kept there, and that it is covered by your privacy notice.

Seenseen in 23.3% of 46,522 containers measured

Third parties it can reach

Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »

script.google.com ×4api.mediaad.org ×3cdn.yektanet.com ×1

What the custom templates can do

Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.

__cvt_13199635_1321 private injects code from www.clarity.ms · runs page-level globals

Detected on

Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.

wallex.ir

What this audit describes

Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.

ContainerGTM-N6526PC
Published version352 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes.
Read at2026-08-11 20:57:39 UTC (a month ago)
Sourcehttps://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-N6526PC
Body checksumba20fcabd0ff5ebae82e17f9e762196cc6a75e145bb51740487e060bd9d44b76
Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead.

Re-audit

This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.

Re-audit GTM-N6526PC

Check another container

Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »