container audit
GTM-N2WTLQ6
87 tags, 18 custom scripts, 11 third-party hosts — an ordinary container, near the middle of what we measure (median: 39 tags, 4 custom scripts).
- 18 custom HTML tags carrying 34 KB of JavaScript — more than 70% of the 46,522 containers we have measured. This runs on every page the container loads on.
- 11 third-party hosts reachable from its tags — more than 80% of the 46,522 containers we have measured.
- Measurement runs through a server container on its own domain — the mark of a mature setup, and rarer than the tooling vendors imply.
Tags87
Custom scripts18
Third parties11
Delivered610 KB
Versions141
What we observed
A real browser loaded sisense.com a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.
Container loaded from
not observed loading
Measurement sent to
google-analytics.com — GoogleThird parties contacted
4 hosts — app-abb.marketo.com, dev.visualwebsiteoptimizer.com, kit.fontawesome.com, cdn.jsdelivr.net
Where the data goes
Nothing fired — we loaded the page and no tag library or measurement request ran, which usually means a consent banner held everything back. The container below still describes what would run once it does. observed on sisense.com More info »
Findings
Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.
reviewWrites cookies directly (2)
2 pieces of custom code set cookies in code.
WhyCookies set this way bypass GTM's consent settings, because the consent checks live in the tag templates rather than in raw JavaScript.
CheckIf any of these cookies are used for analytics or advertising, confirm they are still gated on a consent decision.
Seenseen in 21.2% of 46,522 containers measured
reviewdocument.write (1)
1 piece of custom code call document.write.
Whydocument.write blocks the HTML parser while it runs, and browsers ignore it entirely once the page has finished parsing — so an async-loaded tag using it can silently do nothing.
CheckIf these tags fire on page load they are costing render time; if they fire later they may not be working at all. Worth confirming the tag still does what it was added to do.
Seenseen in 18.4% of 46,522 containers measured
infoLoads JavaScript from another host (6)
6 pieces of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.
WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.
CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.
Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured
infoConsent configuration detected (2)
The container declares one or more consent signals.
WhyConsent handling is present in the container. This describes what the artifact declares; what actually happened on the page is measured separately, above.
CheckConfirm these settings match the consent policy you intend to enforce, and compare them with the before-and-after observation.
Seenseen in 44.6% of 46,522 containers measured
infoVendor IDs written into custom code (1)
1 vendor ID is pasted directly into custom HTML rather than held in a variable or template.
WhyChanging a property, pixel or account then means editing every tag that mentions it, and any one that gets missed keeps sending to the old destination indefinitely.
CheckFine if the ID never changes. If you have ever migrated a property, check that none of these still point at the old one.
Seenseen in 31.4% of 46,522 containers measured
Third parties it can reach
Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »
ajax.aspnetcdn.com ×1cdn.bizible.com ×1connect.facebook.net ×1consent.trustarc.com ×1insightcdn.net ×1js.qualified.com ×1player.vimeo.com ×1static.ads-twitter.com ×1tracking.g2crowd.com ×1www.facebook.com ×1www.google.com ×1
What the custom templates can do
Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.
__cvt_61245087_237 private injects code from snap.licdn.com__cvt_PBGZL gallery injects code from www.redditstatic.com · runs page-level globalsDetected on
Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.
What this audit describes
Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.
| Container | GTM-N2WTLQ6 |
|---|---|
| Published version | 141 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes. |
| Read at | 2026-08-12 22:34:54 UTC (2 months ago) |
| Source | https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-N2WTLQ6 |
| Body checksum | 08bbba567fe10b7f8e2edc1e4771bba38f39ca30aec97a8ebc581b3a8098929aEvidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead. |
Re-audit
This reading is from 2 months ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.
Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »