container audit
GTM-MRJPXMZ
This container ships 70 hand-written scripts (46 KB of JavaScript) to every visitor — more than 96% of the 46,522 containers we have measured. That is an application's worth of code, delivered as tag configuration.
- 810 published versions — each one live for every visitor the moment it was published.
Tags152
Custom scripts70
Third parties21
Delivered655 KB
Versions810
What we observed
A real browser loaded gorjana.com 2 months ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.
Container loaded from
googletagmanager.com — GoogleMeasurement sent to
google-analytics.com — GoogleConsent
a consent platform is present, but our browser could not complete the accept step — so the before-and-after comparison did not run here. 3 hosts appeared only after consent was granted. Google recorded
gcs=G111 (all granted).Third parties contacted
25 hosts — cdn.uselayers.com, use.typekit.net, widget.gotolstoy.com, play.gotolstoy.com, cdn.shopify.com, shop.app, cdn.jsdelivr.net, cdn-static.okendo.io, and 17 more
dataLayer events seen
gtm.js, gtm.dom, gtm.load, edgemesh, userInfoCaptured, dl_user_data, gtm.timer
Where the data goes
Not observed — on the page we loaded, measurement went to Google and nowhere else. observed on gorjana.com More info »
Findings
Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.
reviewHardcoded http:// URL (6)
6 pieces of custom code reference a plain http:// address.
WhyOn an https:// page the browser blocks or upgrades these. Blocked means the tag quietly stops working; upgraded only works if that host also serves https.
CheckCheck whether the hosts below still respond over https, and update the URLs.
Seenseen in 12.8% of 46,522 containers measured
infoLoads JavaScript from another host (18)
18 pieces of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.
WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.
CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.
Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured
infoConsent configuration detected (3)
The container declares one or more consent signals.
WhyConsent handling is present in the container. This describes what the artifact declares; what actually happened on the page is measured separately, above.
CheckConfirm these settings match the consent policy you intend to enforce, and compare them with the before-and-after observation.
Seenseen in 44.6% of 46,522 containers measured
infoUses browser storage (2)
2 pieces of custom code read or write localStorage or sessionStorage.
WhyBrowser storage persists across visits and is not covered by cookie consent tooling, so it is easy to overlook when auditing what you keep on a visitor's device.
CheckConfirm nothing personal is being kept there, and that it is covered by your privacy notice.
Seenseen in 23.3% of 46,522 containers measured
Third parties it can reach
Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »
www.google-analytics.com ×19collector-29326.us.tvsquared.com ×10googleads.g.doubleclick.net ×7s.yimg.com ×6www.googleadservices.com ×6insight.adsrvr.org ×4action.dstillery.com ×2connect.facebook.net ×2mapixl.com ×2tvspix.com ×2analytics.tiktok.com ×1api.ipify.org ×1c.amazon-adsystem.com ×1d.agkn.com ×1d2hrivdxn8ekm8.cloudfront.net ×1js.adsrvr.org ×1pixel.dashfi.dev ×1pixel.springserve.com ×1s.amazon-adsystem.com ×1safevisit.online ×1www.clarity.ms ×1
What the custom templates can do
Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.
__cvt_30680808_680 private runs page-level globals__cvt_30680808_762 private injects code from s.yimg.com · runs page-level globals__cvt_NBP5S gallery injects code from wsv3cdn.audioeye-services.comDetected on
Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.
What this audit describes
Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.
| Container | GTM-MRJPXMZ |
|---|---|
| Published version | 810 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes. |
| Read at | 2026-08-23 17:48:53 UTC (2 months ago) |
| Source | https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-MRJPXMZ |
| Body checksum | 0e6b40f1a7a92da3140e5ebc1df728e29e6f62df33b23b0d288c5fb0250c08f3Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead. |
Re-audit
This reading is from 2 months ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.
Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »