tagora
container audit

GTM-MP43XM

This container ships 315 hand-written scripts (120 KB of JavaScript) to every visitor — more than 99% of the 46,522 containers we have measured. That is an application's worth of code, delivered as tag configuration.

Tags484
Custom scripts315
Third parties15
Delivered694 KB
Versions991

What we observed

A real browser loaded sendsay.ru a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.

Container loaded from bff.sndsy.ru — the site's own host
Measurement sent to google-analytics.com — Google

The container is self-hosted; the measurement still goes to Google. The first-party path that a tagging server provides is not being used for the data itself.

Third parties contacted 19 hosts — mc.yandex.ru, mod.calltouch.ru, smartcaptcha.cloud.yandex.ru, cdn.carrotquest.app, yastatic.net, api.carrotquest.app, api.carrottrack.app, bff.sndsy.ru, and 11 more
dataLayer events seen gtm.js, gtm.dom, gtm.load

Where the data goes

Not observed — on the page we loaded, measurement went to Google and nowhere else. observed on sendsay.ru More info »

Findings

Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.

reviewUniversal Analytics tags still shipped (3)
3 Universal Analytics tags are still in the container.

WhyUniversal Analytics stopped processing data in July 2023. These tags still download and execute on every matching page, and send to an endpoint that discards them.

CheckNothing is being collected from these. Confirm the equivalent GA4 tag exists, then delete them.

Seenseen in 23.2% of 46,522 containers measured

reviewWrites innerHTML (1)
1 piece of custom code assign to innerHTML.

WhyAssigning innerHTML parses the string as HTML. If any of it comes from the URL, the page or a cookie, that is a script-injection route into your own site.

CheckCheck whether the assigned value is a fixed template or built from something a visitor can influence.

Seenseen in 5.7% of 46,522 containers measured

reviewWrites cookies directly (1)
1 piece of custom code set cookies in code.

WhyCookies set this way bypass GTM's consent settings, because the consent checks live in the tag templates rather than in raw JavaScript.

CheckIf any of these cookies are used for analytics or advertising, confirm they are still gated on a consent decision.

Seenseen in 21.2% of 46,522 containers measured

reviewNo consent signal in the container (1)
Nothing in this container sets, reads, or gates on a consent state.

WhyThe container itself neither sets a Consent Mode default, holds any tag back for consent, nor references a known consent platform. Either enforcement lives entirely outside GTM — where it cannot be audited from here — or tags fire regardless of what a visitor chose.

CheckIf a consent platform blocks scripts before GTM loads, this is fine — confirm that is actually the case. If not, tags are firing on a choice nobody recorded.

Seenseen in 52.1% of 46,522 containers measured

infoLoads JavaScript from another host (16)
16 pieces of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.

WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.

CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.

Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured

infoUses browser storage (2)
2 pieces of custom code read or write localStorage or sessionStorage.

WhyBrowser storage persists across visits and is not covered by cookie consent tooling, so it is easy to overlook when auditing what you keep on a visitor's device.

CheckConfirm nothing personal is being kept there, and that it is covered by your privacy notice.

Seenseen in 23.3% of 46,522 containers measured

Third parties it can reach

Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »

image.sendsay.ru ×8mc.yandex.ru ×6eu.i.posthog.com ×5sendsay.ru ×4app.intercom.com ×2app.sendsay.ru ×2mod.calltouch.ru ×2top-fwz1.mail.ru ×2api.calltouch.ru ×1cce.sendsay.ru ×1cdn.botfaqtor.ru ×1cdn.carrotquest.app ×1chat.iprojects.ru ×1telegram.org ×1vk.com ×1

Detected on

Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.

iprojects.rusendsay.ru

What this audit describes

Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.

ContainerGTM-MP43XM
Published version991 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes.
Read at2026-08-22 10:24:51 UTC (a month ago)
Sourcehttps://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-MP43XM
Body checksum8c6a8b7e99c535f7e6f4a61256f0b4207a2a76abb2e5e3a19127894bc7d3a7b8
Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead.

Re-audit

This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.

Re-audit GTM-MP43XM

Check another container

Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »