container audit
GTM-MBLBPG
85 tags, 34 custom scripts, 1 third-party host — an ordinary container, near the middle of what we measure (median: 39 tags, 4 custom scripts).
- 34 custom HTML tags carrying 37 KB of JavaScript — more than 80% of the 46,522 containers we have measured. This runs on every page the container loads on.
- 1 third-party host reachable from its tags.
- Measurement runs through a server container on its own domain — the mark of a mature setup, and rarer than the tooling vendors imply.
- 1,018 published versions — each one live for every visitor the moment it was published.
Tags85
Custom scripts34
Third parties1
Delivered668 KB
Versions1018
What we observed
A real browser loaded flyeralarm.com 2 months ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.
Container loaded from
sgtm2.flyeralarm.com — the site's own host, and googletagmanager.comMeasurement sent to
sgtm2.flyeralarm.com — not GoogleMeasurement runs through the site's own infrastructure. Part of the tag library still comes from Google, which is normal — the two are loaded separately.
Forwarded to
GA4 ×5 — read from the measurement id, not the hostname
Consent
a consent platform is present, but our browser could not complete the accept step — so the before-and-after comparison did not run here. 7 hosts appeared only after consent was granted. Google recorded
gcs=G100 (all denied).Third parties contacted
25 hosts — cdn.contentful.com, graphql.contentful.com, cdn.iubenda.com, integrations.etrusted.com, www.googletagmanager.com, pagead2.googlesyndication.com, cdn.trkkn.com, cs.iubenda.com, and 17 more
dataLayer events seen
gtm.js, gtm.dom, gtm.load, ga_tag_loaded, iubenda_consents, view_promotion
Where the data goes
Confirmed — a browser watched this site send measurement data to sgtm2.flyeralarm.com, not to Google. observed on flyeralarm.com More info »
Findings
Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.
reviewWrites cookies directly (6)
6 pieces of custom code set cookies in code.
WhyCookies set this way bypass GTM's consent settings, because the consent checks live in the tag templates rather than in raw JavaScript.
CheckIf any of these cookies are used for analytics or advertising, confirm they are still gated on a consent decision.
Seenseen in 21.2% of 46,522 containers measured
infoUses browser storage (10)
10 pieces of custom code read or write localStorage or sessionStorage.
WhyBrowser storage persists across visits and is not covered by cookie consent tooling, so it is easy to overlook when auditing what you keep on a visitor's device.
CheckConfirm nothing personal is being kept there, and that it is covered by your privacy notice.
Seenseen in 23.3% of 46,522 containers measured
infoConsent configuration detected (4)
The container declares one or more consent signals.
WhyConsent handling is present in the container. This describes what the artifact declares; what actually happened on the page is measured separately, above.
CheckConfirm these settings match the consent policy you intend to enforce, and compare them with the before-and-after observation.
Seenseen in 44.6% of 46,522 containers measured
infoLoads JavaScript from another host (1)
1 piece of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.
WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.
CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.
Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured
Third parties it can reach
Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »
What the custom templates can do
Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.
__cvt_K8GSG gallery runs page-level globals__cvt_5RM3Q gallery injects code from connect.facebook.net · runs page-level globals__cvt_610432_1366 private injects code from snap.licdn.com__cvt_610432_1524 private injects code from amplify.outbrain.com · runs page-level globals__cvt_610432_1652 private injects code from cdn.trkkn.com, stg-cdn.trkkn.com · runs page-level globals__cvt_610432_2007 private runs page-level globals__cvt_610432_2167 private runs page-level globals__cvt_T9BM6 gallery injects code from t.contentsquare.net · runs page-level globalsDetected on
Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.
What this audit describes
Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.
| Container | GTM-MBLBPG |
|---|---|
| Published version | 1018 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes. |
| Read at | 2026-08-23 17:44:57 UTC (2 months ago) |
| Source | https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-MBLBPG |
| Body checksum | 9f17bacef1fffa53fa546b6a01ec0a97b8300675029ac1700a798b59fce8941fEvidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead. |
Re-audit
This reading is from 2 months ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.
Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »