container audit
GTM-KZ87LVVR
This container ships 46 hand-written scripts (151 KB of JavaScript) to every visitor — more than 90% of the 46,522 containers we have measured. That is an application's worth of code, delivered as tag configuration.
- 7 third-party hosts reachable from its tags — more than 70% of the 46,522 containers we have measured.
- Measurement runs through a server container on its own domain — the mark of a mature setup, and rarer than the tooling vendors imply.
Tags78
Custom scripts46
Third parties7
Delivered668 KB
Versions67
What we observed
A real browser loaded thegreatcourses.com a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.
Container loaded from
googletagmanager.com — GoogleMeasurement sent to
google-analytics.com — GoogleConsent
a consent banner was present and we accepted it. 1 measurement hit left the page before it was granted, carrying a client id (whether that is permitted depends on jurisdiction, and this was not a European visit). no new hosts appeared after granting — either the tags are ungated, or they fire regardless and record the decision. 3 advertising hosts were contacted before anything was granted.
Third parties contacted
25 hosts — kit.fontawesome.com, fonts.googleapis.com, use.typekit.net, cas.zma.gs, ka-p.fontawesome.com, s.go-mpulse.net, acsbap.com, www.googletagmanager.com, and 17 more
dataLayer events seen
gtm.js, gtm.dom, gtm.load, gtm.scrollDepth, gtm.click
Where the data goes
Not observed — on the page we loaded, measurement went to Google and nowhere else. observed on thegreatcourses.com More info »
Findings
Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.
reviewWrites cookies directly (4)
4 pieces of custom code set cookies in code.
WhyCookies set this way bypass GTM's consent settings, because the consent checks live in the tag templates rather than in raw JavaScript.
CheckIf any of these cookies are used for analytics or advertising, confirm they are still gated on a consent decision.
Seenseen in 21.2% of 46,522 containers measured
reviewHardcoded http:// URL (2)
2 pieces of custom code reference a plain http:// address.
WhyOn an https:// page the browser blocks or upgrades these. Blocked means the tag quietly stops working; upgraded only works if that host also serves https.
CheckCheck whether the hosts below still respond over https, and update the URLs.
Seenseen in 12.8% of 46,522 containers measured
reviewNo consent signal in the container (1)
Nothing in this container sets, reads, or gates on a consent state.
WhyThe container itself neither sets a Consent Mode default, holds any tag back for consent, nor references a known consent platform. Either enforcement lives entirely outside GTM — where it cannot be audited from here — or tags fire regardless of what a visitor chose.
CheckIf a consent platform blocks scripts before GTM loads, this is fine — confirm that is actually the case. If not, tags are firing on a choice nobody recorded.
Seenseen in 52.1% of 46,522 containers measured
infoLoads JavaScript from another host (3)
3 pieces of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.
WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.
CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.
Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured
infoUses browser storage (3)
3 pieces of custom code read or write localStorage or sessionStorage.
WhyBrowser storage persists across visits and is not covered by cookie consent tooling, so it is easy to overlook when auditing what you keep on a visitor's device.
CheckConfirm nothing personal is being kept there, and that it is covered by your privacy notice.
Seenseen in 23.3% of 46,522 containers measured
Third parties it can reach
Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »
www.facebook.com ×10fast. ×2c.amazon-adsystem.com ×1cltgtstor001.blob.core.windows.net ×1connect.facebook.net ×1plus.tgcmag.com,wondrium-preprod.tgcmag.com,wondrium-dev.tgcmag.com,wondrium-stage.tgcmag.com,wondrium.com,plus-stage.tgcmag.com,plus.tgcmag.com, ×1www.redditstatic.com ×1
What the custom templates can do
Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.
__cvt_198284821_130 private injects code from x.dwin1.com · runs page-level globals__cvt_198284821_128 private injects code from x.dwin1.comDetected on
Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.
What this audit describes
Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.
| Container | GTM-KZ87LVVR |
|---|---|
| Published version | 67 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes. |
| Read at | 2026-08-13 12:07:12 UTC (a month ago) |
| Source | https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-KZ87LVVR |
| Body checksum | c5caa4749067d4e8abc1ffad1b1ef7c9880864d7452f2bb03a90716d88592e28Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead. |
Re-audit
This reading is from a month ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.
Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »