container audit

GTM-KVMGRPV

90 tags, 32 custom scripts, 8 third-party hosts — an ordinary container, near the middle of what we measure (median: 39 tags, 4 custom scripts).

32 custom HTML tags carrying 15 KB of JavaScript — more than 80% of the 46,522 containers we have measured. This runs on every page the container loads on.
8 third-party hosts reachable from its tags — more than 70% of the 46,522 containers we have measured.
303 published versions — each one live for every visitor the moment it was published.

Tags90

Custom scripts32

Third parties8

Delivered535 KB

Versions303

What we observed

A real browser loaded teket.jp a month ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.

Container loaded from googletagmanager.com — Google

Measurement sent to google-analytics.com — Google

Consent a consent banner was present and we accepted it. Measurement fired beforehand but carried no identifier — analytics_storage was denied, which is Consent Mode working as designed rather than a gap. no new hosts appeared after granting — either the tags are ungated, or they fire regardless and record the decision. Google recorded gcs=G100 (all denied).

Third parties contacted 23 hosts — www.google.com, www.googletagmanager.com, code.jquery.com, www.gstatic.com, s.yimg.jp, connect.facebook.net, static.ads-twitter.com, ec-concier.com, and 15 more

dataLayer events seen gtm.js, default_consent, gtm.dom, gtm.load, block_impression, gtm.click, gtm.linkClick, gtm.scrollDepth

Where the data goes

Not observed — on the page we loaded, measurement went to Google and nowhere else. observed on teket.jp More info »

Findings

Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.

infoLoads JavaScript from another host (4)

4 pieces of custom code fetch and run JavaScript from another host.

WhyWhatever that host serves executes with full access to the page — it can read the DOM, cookies and form fields. The code is not in this container, so it can change at any time without any change here.

CheckConfirm you recognise every host below and that someone owns the relationship. A host you cannot name is the one to chase.

Seenseen in 54.4% of 46,522 containers measured

infoUses browser storage (4)

4 pieces of custom code read or write localStorage or sessionStorage.

WhyBrowser storage persists across visits and is not covered by cookie consent tooling, so it is easy to overlook when auditing what you keep on a visitor's device.

CheckConfirm nothing personal is being kept there, and that it is covered by your privacy notice.

Seenseen in 23.3% of 46,522 containers measured

infoVendor IDs written into custom code (4)

4 vendor IDs are pasted directly into custom HTML rather than held in a variable or template.

WhyChanging a property, pixel or account then means editing every tag that mentions it, and any one that gets missed keeps sending to the old destination indefinitely.

CheckFine if the ID never changes. If you have ever migrated a property, check that none of these still point at the old one.

Seenseen in 31.4% of 46,522 containers measured

infoConsent configuration detected (1)

The container declares one or more consent signals.

WhyConsent handling is present in the container. This describes what the artifact declares; what actually happened on the page is measured separately, above.

CheckConfirm these settings match the consent policy you intend to enforce, and compare them with the before-and-after observation.

Seenseen in 44.6% of 46,522 containers measured

Third parties it can reach

Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »

www.google-analytics.com ×39analytics.twitter.com ×6 connect.facebook.net ×6 www.googleadservices.com ×6 teket.jp ×5 www.facebook.com ×2 docs.teket.jp ×1 www.clarity.ms ×1

What the custom templates can do

Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.

__cvt_43127056_106 private injects code from s.yimg.jp · runs page-level globals

__cvt_43127056_108 private injects code from s.yimg.jp · runs page-level globals

__cvt_43127056_138 private injects code from s.yimg.jp · runs page-level globals

Detected on

Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.

teket.jp

What this audit describes

Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.

Container	`GTM-KVMGRPV`
Published version	`303` — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes.
Read at	2026-08-13 09:59:08 UTC (2 months ago)
Source	`https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-KVMGRPV`
Body checksum	`c71c4ba2530e8e6e943d028c424326edbefddb4e9656be38308a4017398270b5` Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead.

Re-audit

This reading is from 2 months ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.

Re-audit GTM-KVMGRPV

Check another container

Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »