container audit
GTM-KMPTZDZ
25 tags, 6 custom scripts, 2 third-party hosts — an ordinary container, near the middle of what we measure (median: 39 tags, 4 custom scripts).
- 6 custom HTML tags carrying 18 KB of JavaScript. This runs on every page the container loads on.
- 2 third-party hosts reachable from its tags.
Tags25
Custom scripts6
Third parties2
Delivered431 KB
Versions263
What we observed
A real browser loaded margaritavilleresorts.com 2 months ago and recorded every request it made. This is what happened, as distinct from what the container is configured to do. It is one page load — anything that fires only deeper in the site did not fire here.
Container loaded from
saltyrim.margaritavilleresorts.com — the site's own host, and googletagmanager.comMeasurement sent to
saltyrim.margaritavilleresorts.com — not GoogleMeasurement runs through the site's own infrastructure. Part of the tag library still comes from Google, which is normal — the two are loaded separately.
Forwarded to
GA4 ×2 — read from the measurement id, not the hostname
Consent
OneTrust answered its own API. 2 measurement hits left the page before it was granted, carrying a client id (whether that is permitted depends on jurisdiction, and this was not a European visit). no new hosts appeared after granting — either the tags are ungated, or they fire regardless and record the decision. Google recorded
gcs=G111 (all granted). 3 advertising hosts were contacted before anything was granted.Third parties contacted
23 hosts — unpkg.com, use.typekit.net, cdn.cookielaw.org, static.cloudflareinsights.com, margaritavillesandiegogaslamp.realtimereservation.com, components.flip.to, player.vimeo.com, d1l4e1efm2qo9x.cloudfront.net, and 15 more
dataLayer events seen
gtm.js, gtm.dom, OneTrustLoaded, OptanonLoaded, flipto.consent.changed, onFliptoDiscoveryLoad, onFliptoDiscoveryExperimentSet, gtm.load
Where the data goes
Confirmed — a browser watched this site send measurement data to saltyrim.margaritavilleresorts.com, not to Google. observed on margaritavilleresorts.com More info »
Findings
Ordered by consequence. review has a concrete cost when it bites; info is real but depends on your setup. Seen is how common it is across the containers we have measured — reported separately on purpose, because common and harmless are different claims.
reviewWrites cookies directly (3)
3 pieces of custom code set cookies in code.
WhyCookies set this way bypass GTM's consent settings, because the consent checks live in the tag templates rather than in raw JavaScript.
CheckIf any of these cookies are used for analytics or advertising, confirm they are still gated on a consent decision.
Seenseen in 21.2% of 46,522 containers measured
infoConsent configuration detected (2)
The container declares one or more consent signals.
WhyConsent handling is present in the container. This describes what the artifact declares; what actually happened on the page is measured separately, above.
CheckConfirm these settings match the consent policy you intend to enforce, and compare them with the before-and-after observation.
Seenseen in 44.6% of 46,522 containers measured
infoUses browser storage (1)
1 piece of custom code read or write localStorage or sessionStorage.
WhyBrowser storage persists across visits and is not covered by cookie consent tooling, so it is easy to overlook when auditing what you keep on a visitor's device.
CheckConfirm nothing personal is being kept there, and that it is covered by your privacy notice.
Seenseen in 23.3% of 46,522 containers measured
Third parties it can reach
Each host is a party that can execute code or receive data in a visitor's browser. Follow one to see who else loads it. More info »
What the custom templates can do
Custom templates are third-party code shipped inside the container. Injecting scripts and running page globals is ordinary for them — most tag templates need it to work — so this is an inventory, not a warning. It lists the capability each template declares so you can match it against templates you meant to install.
__cvt_31753841_149 private injects code from components.flip.to__cvt_31753841_598 private injects code from cdn.flip.to · runs page-level globals__cvt_31753841_639 private injects code from components.flip.to__cvt_31753841_162 private runs page-level globals__cvt_31753841_169 private injects code from components.flip.to__cvt_31753841_172 private runs page-level globals__cvt_31753841_592 private runs page-level globals__cvt_31753841_637 private injects code from components.flip.toDetected on
Sites observed loading this container. A container used across many hosts is a shared template; one on a single host is a bespoke build. Follow a site to see every container it loads.
What this audit describes
Containers change. These findings describe one specific artifact, and you can re-fetch it to check this reading.
| Container | GTM-KMPTZDZ |
|---|---|
| Published version | 263 — the identity of this configuration. It changes only when someone publishes. |
| Read at | 2026-08-23 17:39:20 UTC (2 months ago) |
| Source | https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id=GTM-KMPTZDZ |
| Body checksum | b41ea016d82e71c67cce9b45ee4b81d9b94a3d013c35aeeaeb8bcbc8b3e9f3a9Evidence of the exact bytes we read, not an identity: Google varies the response per request, so re-fetching an unchanged container yields a different checksum. Compare the published version instead. |
Re-audit
This reading is from 2 months ago. A container can be republished at any time, and nothing here updates on its own — a fresh read is the only way to know whether it still says this. Running it again replaces this page in place, so the link keeps working.
Put this container under version control. Tagora exports it to a repository you own, so every change arrives as a pull request. How it works »